Report on the investigation of

the grounding and total loss of

the United Kingdom-registered fishing vessel Arosa (M321)on Doonguddle rock

off the west coast of Ireland

with the loss of 12 crew members

3 October 2000

Marine Accident Investigation Branch

First Floor, Carlton House

Carlton Place

Southampton

United Kingdom 

SO15 2DZ

Report No 41/2001

December 2001Extract from 

The Merchant Shipping 

(Accident Reporting and Investigation)

Regulations 1999

The fundamental purpose of investigating an accident under these Regulations is to

determine its circumstances and the cause with the aim of improving the safety of life

at sea and the avoidance of accidents in the future. It is not the purpose to apportion

liability, nor, except so far as is necessary to achieve the fundamental purpose, to

apportion blame.CONTENTSPage

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 

SYNOPSIS 1

SECTION 1 - FACTUAL INFORMATION 3

1.1 Particulars of Arosa and accident 3

1.2 Arosa 4

1.2.1 The vessel and background 4

1.2.2 The crew 5

1.2.3 Details of vessel survey 6

1.2.4 Navigational equipment and practices 7

1.3 Narrative 10

1.3.1 Events leading up to the grounding 10

1.3.2 Events after the grounding 12

1.4 Environmental conditions 15

1.5 Keeping a safe navigational watch on fishing vessels 18

1.6 Musters and drills 19

1.7 Fishermen’s safety training 20

SECTION 2 - ANALYSIS 21

2.1 Aim 21

2.2 The reasons for apparently seeking shelter 21

2.3 The approach to the Irish Coast 22

2.4 The grounding 23

2.4.1 The approach to Skerd Rocks 23

2.4.2 Possible reasons for the grounding 26

2.5 The abandonment of Arosa 30

SECTION 3 - CONCLUSIONS 31

3.1 Findings 31

3.2 Possible contributory causes 32

SECTION 4 - RECOMMENDATIONS 34

Annex 1GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS °C degrees Celsius

COSPAS/SARSAT Search and rescue satellite system

EPIRB Emergency position indicating radio beacon

EPSHOM établissement Principal du Service Hydrographique et

Océangraphique de la Marine

ETA Estimated time of arrival

gt gross tonnage

kW kilowatt

MAFF Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food

MCA Maritime and Coastguard Agency

UK United Kingdom

UTC Universal co-ordinated time

VHF Very high frequencySYNOPSIS At about 0400 (UTC) on 3 October 2000, the United

Kingdom-registered, but Spanish owned and operated,

fishing vessel Arosaran aground on Doonguddle rock,

which is off the west coast of Ireland and about 10 miles

north of the north entrance to Galway Bay. The vessel

was lost, and all but one of the 13 crew members lost

their lives. The Irish Department of the Marine and

Natural Resources informed the MAIB of the accident at

0840 that day.  Captain P Kavanagh carried out the

investigation.

The fishing vessel had stopped fishing at about 1846 on

2 October 2000 and had begun a passage towards the

nearest point of land on the Irish coast. The weather

forecast for the area in which she was fishing, was for winds to increase up to a

possible storm force 10. The patrón de pesca (skipper) apparently decided to head for

shelter in Galway Bay.  Arosadid not make a direct course to the entrance of Galway

Bay but was offset to the north, which put the strong winds and rough seas further

abaft the beam. This eased the motion of the vessel for the crew members, who were

asleep in their cabins. Later on during the passage, the patrón de costa (mate) took

over the navigational watch. 

A deckhand was still awake in his bunk when he heard a loud bang, which he

dismissed as a large wave hitting the side of the vessel. However, shortly afterwards

he felt the vessel striking rocks and heard the patrón de costa shouting in the

accommodation alleyway that the vessel was taking in water, and that everyone

should go on deck. The deckhand went on deck and was joined by most of the crew.

They launched the two liferafts, but the crew members were unable to board them

because of the heavy seas which washed most of the crew, including the deckhand,

off the vessel.  However, the deckhand managed to find a handhold on a rock, and

pulled himself up and out of the waves. 

Arosa had broadcast a distress message giving her position, that she was taking in

water and requesting a helicopter. Valentia Radio received the broadcast, and a

helicopter from Shannon was dispatched. The survivor was picked up shortly after the

helicopter arrived on scene, and the patrón de pesca about 20 minutes later. However,

the latter was unconscious and, despite the aircrew carrying out resuscitation

techniques, he later died. Four bodies were found that day and a further one the next

day, leaving six men still missing.

It has not been possible to determine the direct causes of the accident as the two

people with knowledge of the navigation both lost their lives. 

The report has no recommendations to make.

12Photograph 1

Arosa3SECTION 1 - FACTUAL INFORMATION 1.1 PARTICULARS OF AROSAAND ACCIDENT

Vessel details

Registered owner : Arosa Limited

Port of registry : Milford Haven

Flag : United Kingdom

Type : Side trawler

Built : 1974 in Santander, Spain

Classification society : Bureau Veritas

Construction : Steel

Registered length : 32.61m

Gross tonnage : 248.0

Engine type and power : MAK - 970kW

Service speed : 10 knots

Accident details

Time and date : 0404 (UTC) on 3 October 2000

Location of accident : Latitude 53° 15.21’N Longitude 009° 59.42’ W 

on Doonguddle rock off the west coast of Ireland.

People on board : 13

Fatalities : 12

Damage : Total loss of vessel4

1.2AROSA

1.2.1 The vessel and background

Arosawas a 26-year-old side trawler, in which the fishing gear was operated

over the starboard side. She was a typical Spanish design of the time when she

was built. She had a shelter deck between the whaleback and the

accommodation superstructure, which was aft. The shelter deck housed the

main winch for the warps to the net. The wheelhouse was about three-quarters

aft from forward. The original plan showed that there was accommodation for 15

crew members. However, at a later date, a cabin was built into the wheelhouse

for the patrón de pesca *.

(*Note: patrón de pesca = skipper and patrón de costa = mate or coastal

skipper)

During the last 30 years, side trawling has been replaced by stern trawling

techniques in the British fishing fleet.  However, there are fishing vessels using

the side method still operating out of Spain.  Photograph 2shows Arosain the

process of fishing, and her trawl warps can be seen leading out on the

starboard side from the forward and after gallows. When the fishing gear was

hauled in, the warps were shortened until the trawl doors reached the gallows.

The winch was then stopped and the doors were hooked on to the gallows and

disconnected from the warps, before the rest of the gear was brought alongside.

Photograph 2

Arosa engaged in fishing

Photograph courtesy of Irish Marine Corps5

Spanish fishing vessels have been fishing in the Atlantic seas west of Ireland for

several hundreds of years. However, in 1976 territorial waters were extended to

give a 200-mile Economic Exclusion Zone. At that time Spain was not in the

European Union, and the extension excluded Spanish fishing vessels from their

traditional fishing grounds. To overcome this problem, Spanish owners bought

into the British fleet which had spare quota capacity, by obtaining British fishing

licenses and registering their vessels in the UK.  It was the same, to some

extent, with Spanish owned vessels and the Irish fleet.  Although Spain has

since entered the European Union, there are still a number of Spanish owned

and operated fishing vessels on the UK register. As a condition of their fishing

licences, Anglo-Spanish vessels must have a registered office in the UK and

have to visit (but not necessarily land catches at) a UK port eight times per year.

In 1999, through MAFF, it was deemed that Anglo-Spanish fishing vessels

should show a genuine economic link with the UK. The consequence was that

they now have to land 50% of their quota stocks in the UK and, on average, this

amounts to between eight and ten visits per year. Anglo-Spanish fishing vessels

mostly catch hake, megrims and prawns. Only a few of them catch non-quota

fish such as sharks and ling, which they have to land twice every six months.

Using a satellite-based vessel monitoring system, Arosaautomatically sent her

position, speed and course every two hours, whether she was in port or at sea.

The monitoring system was an EEC requirement, which had come into effect at

the beginning of 2000. The last transmission was sent at 0246 UTC on 3

October 2000, which was just over an hour before the grounding, giving her

position as latitude 53° 18’ 02” N longitude 010° 17’ 53” W, with her course as

080° and her speed as 9 knots.

1.2.2 The crew 

There were 13 crew members on board Arosaat the time of the accident, 10 of

whom were Spanish, 2 were from Ilha S?o Tomé, and 1 from Ghana. The oldest

crew member was one of the deckhands, who would have been 57 years old a

day after the accident, and the youngest was the sole survivor, who was 24

years old.

The patrón de pesca was 31 year old Ramon Pardo Juncal.  He held a Spanish

first class certificate as skipper in fishing vessels up to 700gt for deep sea

fishing, bounded by the co-ordinates 60°N, 35°S, 20°W and 52°E. His certificate

also allowed him to sail as mate on vessels over 700gt. He also held certificates

in radiotelephone operation, fire-fighting and sea survival. He had more than 10

years experience fishing on the Grand Sole Bank (about 100 miles south of

Fastnet on the south coast of Ireland), the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) and

South Africa. He had been sailing for over a year on Arosaas patrón de costa

and, by the time of the accident, had served three trips as patrón de pesca.6

The patrón de costa, Euginio Diaz Carracelas, was nearly 44 years old. He held

a Spanish second class certificate for fishing in coastal areas of the Atlantic. He

could take command of vessels of up to 75gt in fishing grounds no more than 60

miles off the coast bounded by 39°00’N, 21°00’N and the meridians of Europa

Point and the Canary Islands. He had gained his fishing experience on the

Grand Sole Bank, and off the coast of Mauritania, the Canary Islands, Portugal

and Canada. He had joined Arosa4 months previously. 

The survivor had been a deep-sea fisherman since leaving school 8 years

before. He had served mostly on factory ships in the north and south Atlantic

and had worked before on a similar vessel to Arosa, which he joined in January

2000. He had not attended a sea survival course, although he believed most of

the other crew members had done so. The fishing trips lasted between 19 and

20 days.

The MCA equates the patrón de pesca’s Spanish certificate to a UK Class 2

certificate of competency, and the patrón de costa’s Spanish certificate to a

Class 3 certificate of competency.  The minimum certificate requirements were a

Class 1 and a Class 2 certificate of competency.

1.2.3 Details of vessel survey

Arosaentered the UK registry in 1984 under her previous name of Slebech

Three.  The following year, the vessel changed ownership, and structural

alterations were made in way of the shelter deck. After a period laid-up in Spain,

the vessel changed ownership again in about 1994, when she was bought by

her present owners. 

The last United Kingdom Fishing Vessel Certificate was issued by the MCA on

19 June 2000 and was valid until 13 November 2003. 

As part of her qualification for a certificate, she had been surveyed by the

classification society, Bureau Veritas, on 30 October 1999, with respect to her

hull and superstructure; her hatchways, doors, ventilators and other openings;

her main and auxiliary machinery; her bilge pumping arrangements; her

electrical equipment and installations and her steering gear, watertight doors,

means of communication, refrigerating plants and her anchors and cables.  A

periodical bottom survey, which Bureau Veritas had recommended should be

conducted by 15 July 2000, had not been carried out.

She had the following relevant safety equipment:

2 x 16 person inflatable liferafts with 71m long painters.  Both were

stowed on the wheelhouse top and had been last serviced on 22

September 1999; (see photograph 2)

1 inflatable, 3.9m long, boat stowed aft of the shelterdeck and served by

a single arm davit; 7

a survival craft portable radio;

a COSPAS/SARSAT EPIRB located on the wheelhouse top;

12 lifejackets of various makes and 3 Cosalt Premier lifejackets

distributed throughout the vessel;

4 lifebuoys of which 2 had buoyant lines and 2 had smoke markers/lights;

12 ship’s distress parachute signals;

a Kenwood main transmitter/receiver radio telephone and alarm signal

generator;

a Skanti reserve transmitter/receiver radio telephone and alarm signal

generator; and

a fixed Crame VHF radio transreceiver.

(The vessel was exempted from a portable radio, provided that a water

protected VHF radio transreceiver was carried on board.)

In December 1999, a renewal survey for her UK fishing vessel certificate

showed a number of deficiencies needed to be attended to, but none were

relevant to the accident.

Arosawas granted a number of exemptions from The Fishing Vessels (Safety

Provisions) Rules 1975 concerning structural fire protection and fire detection,

ventilation systems, means of escape from the engine room, certain compass

requirements, certain nautical publication requirements (navigational tables, list

of lights, sailing directions, tidal steam atlases) and certain fire appliances.

Survival suits are not a statutory requirement and none were on board Arosa.

1.2.4 Navigational equipment and practices

The vessel was fitted with:

an Anritsu RA-722 UA radar; 

a Raytheon radar; and 

2 Shipmate RS-5800 GPS sets connected to a Sodena Turbo 2000

plotter, on which there were 22 vector electronic navigation charts.

The electronic navigation chart (see chart extract 1 overleaf), for the area in

which Arosawent aground, was a Sodena digitised/vector version of EPSHOM

chart number 7197 of 1988 at a scale of 1:150,000.  This was largely based on8

the British Admiralty chart number 2173 Loop Head to Slyne Head(see chart

extract 4 at section 2.4.1).  The distribution of this electronic navigation chart

stopped several years before, because Sodena systems now use C-MAP

electronic charts of CM93 version 2(see chart extract 6 at section 2.4.2).  As

an unconditional requirement of EPSHOM, the Sodena software had a start-up

pop-up screen, giving a warning that up-to-date paper charts should be on

board.  This had to be acknowledged by the operator. There were paper charts

on board sufficient for the area of operation.

Of the eight identified electronic navigation charts which were on board Arosa,

none were less than a scale of 1:150,000. These are considered suitable for

fishing offshore, but not for coastal navigation when the largest scale chart

should be used. 

The electronic company Hispano Radio Electrónica SAL of Marin (Ponteverdra)

last had dealings with Arosa’s navigation systems on 14 April 2000, when the

following work was carried out:

? automatic pilot replaced;

? radar replaced;

? Sodena plotter monitor replaced;

? Crame 5000 VHF radio repaired;

? Sonda Furuno FCV-291sounder repaired;

? Sonda Koden CVS-8831 sounder repaired;

? Raytheon Orders radar equipment repaired; and

? general navigational equipment checked.

This work was carried out after Arosahad suffered heavy weather damage. 

The patrón de pesca and the patrón de costa carried out the navigational

watches at all times at sea.

The patrón de pesca took the navigational watch between 0600 and 1200 and

between 1600 and 2300. His cabin was integral with, and at the aft part of, the

wheelhouse.

The patrón de costa took the navigational watch between 2300 and 0600 and

between 1200 and 1600.

There was no bridge chair, but a small stool was at the aft end of the

wheelhouse where the patróns took their meals.9

While on passage between the fishing grounds and ports and vice versa, a

deckhand was also in the wheelhouse, acting as a lookout, for periods of about

2 hours.  No watch alarm was fitted. Chart Extract 1 - Extract from the electronic navigation chart in use onArosa10

1.3 NARRATIVE

All times are UTC.

1.3.1 Events leading up to the grounding

Arosaleft Marin in north-west Spain on 8 September 2000. On 22 September

she berthed at Ardrossan to land her catch, take on stores and bunkers, and to

effect a repair to her hull. A diving firm was contracted and four divers examined

the hull. A small hole was found directly below the forward gallows and about

1.5m beneath the waterline. The plate around the hole was soft and it was

decided that an internal repair should be made, which was carried out by a local

ship repair firm (see Annex 1).

During this time in port, an MCA surveyor visited Arosaand detained her

because the patrón de pesca and the patrón de costa did not have UK

certificates of equivalent competency. Two British skippers holding full skipper’s

certificates of competency were found, and they joined the vessel on 26

September. The detention order was lifted and Arosaleft Ardrossan later that

afternoon. On 27 September, on her way to the fishing grounds, she berthed

briefly in Killybegs harbour where the two British skippers disembarked.  At this

time, it was noted that some water was apparently entering the vessel in way of

the repaired area. The mechanic then constructed a cement box, using some

metal plates and inserting them between frames either side of the apparent leak.

The vessel continued on passage with exactly the same crew as she had on

board when she was detained, and began fishing just before dawn on 28

September(see chart extract 2 opposite).  That evening, she concentrated her

fishing in a 9-mile square box centred on a latitude 53° 40’N longitude 011°

50’W. Still fishing, she left this box in the early hours of 1 October and headed

south. At 0226 she made her compulsory report to Valentia Radio that she was

leaving fishing area Eand moving to fishing box area F. Later that morning she

entered a new 20-mile square box centred on latitude 53°00’N and 12° 15’W.

The weather was bad that day, but it improved the next day.

At about 1846 on 2 October, Arosastopped fishing, left her grounds and headed

for the coast of Ireland at full speed of 10 knots. At 2142, she made her

compulsory report to Valentia Radio that she was leaving fishing box area Fand

moving to fishing box area E. She also reported the amount of fish which she

had on board; a total of about 4.5 tonnes. When the catch had been cleared, all

the crew had a meal together, after which they showered, went to bed, or stayed

in the messroom. By 2230 (0030 vessel’s time) everyone had gone to bed

except for the patrón de costa, who was in the wheelhouse in charge of the

navigational watch. Apparently, there was no deckhand on watch, as the patrón

de costa wanted the crew to rest. Normally after stowing the gear, he would

have told a deckhand to shower and have a sandwich before taking the watch

with him.11Chart Extract 2 - Showing the vessel monitoring positions (from 0840 27/9/00 to 0246 3/10/00) ofArosaKillybegs  

Rossaveel

Position of grounding

3/10 - 0046

2/10 - 0046

2100

1/10 - 0042

1/10 - 0044

29/9 - 0042

28/9 - 0040

27/9 - 0840Reproduced from Admiralty Chart 2 by permission of the

Controller of HMSO and the UK Hydrographic Office12

1.3.2 Events after the grounding

One of the deckhands (referred to in this report as the survivor) was awake in

his bunk when he felt a blow to the vessel. He did not take much notice of it

because he thought that it was a big wave breaking against the vessel. After

several minutes he felt Arosastriking rocks, and shortly afterwards the general

alarm went off. The patrón de costa had entered the accommodation

passageway from the wheelhouse.  He shouted for the crew to get up and to go

on deck as the vessel was sinking. The survivor saw many of the crew running

to the upper decks; the vessel was still striking the rocks.  Arosathen became

lodged between two rocks and she stopped moving. 

The electricity failed and the main engine stopped soon after the grounding.

When the survivor reached the upper deck, he saw all the crew except for the

cook, Jose Ramon Garcia Figueroa, and the oldest fisherman on board, Jose

Antonio Ferreiros Perez, both of whom he had not seen since dinner the

evening before. The rest of the crew members were wearing lifejackets,

although some had been donned hastily, and had not been tied securely. He did

not don a lifejacket himself as he knew the vessel was aground, and he thought

that it would restrict his movements and he would be thrown against the rocks. If

it had been an open sea situation he would have donned one.

Arosawas listing heavily to starboard, and the survivor found himself with the

two patróns, the engineer, Alfredo Estevez Garcia, the bosun, Julian Soto

Fuentes, and two deckhands, Fransisco Filgueira Fernandez and Luis Miguel

Vidal Rivadulla, near the wheelhouse. He also saw another deckhand, Orlando

Soares, nearby and the deckhand, Jesus Lafuente Chazo, making his way to

the deck.  He saw the engine room rating, Sebastian Vaz de Almeida, on top of

the wheelhouse, and the deckhand, Albertino Herculando da Costa Cravid,

clinging on to the side rail. 

One of the deckhands said that they should launch the liferafts, and the engine

room rating and two other deckhands assisted him. They carried out this task

but did not board the rafts because they had drifted away from the vessel; the

drop from the deck was high, due to the starboard list, and they considered that

the high seas would have made it difficult for them to remain in the rafts.

One of the deckhands moved forward to the bow, which was by now close to a

cliff face. All the others close to the survivor were, one by one, swept away by

the waves. As the survivor was swept away, he could see the engine room

rating and a deckhand still on the wheelhouse top. When he came to the

su***ce, he was alongside Arosaand he tried to climb back on board, but was

unable to do so. He was being tossed by the waves and battered on the rocks.

The next time he managed to get his head above water, he was beside a large

rock, on which he was able to find a hand hold. Before the next wave hit him, he

was able to climb up the rock out of the reach of the waves. 13

At 0404, Valentia Coastguard Radio VHF radio received a distress message on

channel 16 from Arosasaying that she was in position 53° 15.21’ North and

009° 59.42’ West, and taking in water, and requesting a helicopter. A “Mayday

Relay” was broadcast at 0410, giving the name of the fishing vessel, her

position, the nature of her distress; four vessels in the area responded. The

Aran Islands lifeboat and the Shannon rescue helicopter R115 were tasked to

the distress scene. 

The survivor saw a light in the distance, which became brighter, and then he

heard the noise of the rotor blades of a helicopter. He waved to the helicopter

and was winched up off the rock, at 0519. The helicopter continued to search

for other survivors. At 0549 the patrón de pesca was found in the water and he

was winched up.  He was unconscious so the helicopter crew carried out

resuscitation techniques on him, while travelling to Galway hospital. However,

he later died.

At 0542, rescue helcopter R116 was tasked from Dublin to the distress scene. A

French fixed wing aircraft had also been tasked to the area and arrived there at

about 0628. The aircraft began a search for survivors, operating at about 150m

above sea level.  Due to deteriorating weather conditions, the aircraft was

released about an hour later. At that time rescue helicopter R110 was tasked to

fly to Galway and R115 was appointed as on-scene commander of air assets. At

0742, R115 reported sighting an upturned liferaft about 2 cables north of

Doonguddle rock. 

The weather was deteriorating further, and it was decided that only one

helicopter should search the area at a time, to be relieved when necessary by

the others waiting in Galway.  The visibility had reduced to 1 mile. The wreck of

Arosawas visible, but she was almost submerged under the waves (see

photographs 3, 4 and 5). The vessel was facing south-east and was on the

western side of Doonguddle.

At 0928, R116 recovered a body about 3 miles north of Doonguddle rock. An

Irish naval vessel and two fishing vessels joined the lifeboat. Coastguard units

were searching coastal areas. During the rest of the day, three other bodies

were recovered, one of which was in a liferaft. Two of the bodies were not

wearing lifejackets and one body’s lifejacket was half on. Later that afternoon

the search was called off as the wind was north-west 52 knots gusting to 55

knots (force 10). 

Another body was recovered the next day. Diving on the wreck to look for

survivors was discussed, but it was deemed too dangerous for the divers

because of the bad weather conditions. 

From the very outset of the emergency, the transmissions fromArosa’s EPIRB

had been picked up and Dublin MRCC was alerted to them. 14

The bodies recovered from the sea were that of the patrón de pesca, the patrón

de costa, the engineer, the cook, the bosun and the oldest deckhand. Several of

the bodies did not have lifejackets on them.  The engine room rating and five

deckhands were still missing. 

Photograph 3

Photograph 415

1.4 ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS

Sunset on 2 October was at 1833. On the morning of 3 October nautical twilight

began at 0532, civil twilight 0612 and sunrise was at 0647. The whole time from

leaving the fishing grounds to the grounding was in darkness.

The sea su***ce temperature was about 13°C, the predicted maximum being

15°C (August) and the minimum 9.5°C (February).

An assessment of the weather conditions (supplied by the Meteorological

Office) relating to the movements of Arosais as follows:

The general weather situation.At 0000 on 2 October 2000, a centre of low

pressure was situated to the north of Ireland, resulting in gale force west-north-

westerly winds across the west coast of Ireland. As this low pressure moved

away north-eastwards, the winds in the area decreased in strength during the

day, but again increased and backed south-south-easterly by 1800, with the

approach of a warm front from the south-west. Winds remained at about force 7

overnight from a southerly direction as a further depression approached from

the south-west. The centre of the depression was located to the south-west of

Ireland by 1200 on 3 October 2000, giving winds from east of south over the

area.

Photographs 3,4 and 5 courtesy of Shannon Marine SAR

Photograph 516Date/Time Position Wind Sea Swell Weather Visibility

2/10/00

1200

53°N,

12°30’W

4 to 5

SW

Moderate

to rough

(2.5m)

Heavy (4.5m)

NW

Fair Moderate

to good

2/10/10

1500

53°N,

12°30’W

4 to 5

S

Moderate

(1.5m)

Moderate to

heavy (4m),

NW

Fair Moderate

to good

2/10/00

1800

53°N,

12°30’W

6 to 7

SSE

Moderate

(1.5m)

Moderate

(3.5m) WSW

Rain at

times

Moderate

2/10/00

2100

53°N, 12° W 6

SSW

Rough

(3m)

Low (1.5m),

W

Rain at

times

Moderate

to poor

3/10/00

0000

53°N, 11° W 7 SW Very

rough

(4.5m)

Not

distinguished

from sea

Rain or

drizzle

Moderate

to poor

3/10/00

0300

53°15’N,

10°W

7

SSW

Very

rough

(5.5m)

Not

distinguished

from sea

Rain or

drizzle

Moderate

to poor

3/10/00

0600

53°15’N,

10°W

6 to 7

S

Rough to

very

rough

(4m)

Low (1m),

WSW

Rain or

drizzle

Moderate

to poor

3/10/00

0900

53°15’N,

10°W

7

SSE

Rough

(3m)

Moderate

(3m), SW

Rain or

drizzle

Moderate

to poor

3/10/00

1200

53°15’N,

10°W

7 to 8

SSE

Rough

(3.5m)

Low to

moderate

(2m) SW

Rain or

drizzle

Moderate

to poor17

At 1130 on 2 October 2000, the Meteorological Office shipping forecast for the

area in which Arosawas fishing (Shannon), and the areas around it, was as

follows:

There are warnings of gales in Wight, Portland, Plymouth, Finisterre,

Sole Lundy, Fastnet, Irish Sea, Shannon, Rockall, Malin, Hebrides

Bailey and Southeast Iceland. 

The general synopsis at 0700: Low Iceland moving slowly west and

deepening 974 by 0700. Tomorrow Atlantic low 976 moving rapidly north-

east, expected 100 miles west of Shannon 978 by same time.

Sole:Southerly 6 to gale 8, occasionally severe gale 9. Rain or showers.

Moderate to good.

Lundy, Fastnet, Irish Sea: North-westerly backing southerly 6 to gale 8,

perhaps severe gale 9 later in Fastnet. Showers then rain. Moderate or

good.

Shannon: Southerly becoming cyclonic 6 to gale 8, occasionally severe

gale 9, perhaps storm 10 later. Rain or showers. Good becoming

moderate or poor.

Rockall:Southwesterly becoming cyclonic 5 or 6 increasing 7 or 8.

Showers then rain. Good becoming moderate or poor.

At 1725 on 2 October 2000, the Meteorological Office issued the following

forecast:

There are warnings of gales in Plymouth, Finisterre, Sole, Lundy, Fastnet,

Irish Sea, Shannon, Rockall, Bailey, and Southeast Iceland. 

The general synopsis at 1300: Low north-west Iceland 977 moving

slowly south and filling 980 by 1300 tomorrow. Atlantic low 972 moving

rapidly north-east, expected Shannon 985 by same time.

Sole:Southerly veering north-westerly 6 to gale 8, occasionally severe

gale 9. Rain or drizzle. Moderate or good.

Lundy, Fastnet, Irish Sea:Westerly backing southerly 4 or 5, increasing

6 to gale 8, perhaps severe gale 9 later. Showers then rain. Moderate or

good.

Shannon:Southerly veering north-westerly 7 to severe gale 9, perhaps

storm 10 later. Rain or showers. Mainly moderate.

Rockall:Southerly becoming cyclonic, then north-westerly 5 to 7

occasionally gale 8, perhaps severe gale 9 later. Occasional rain. Mainly

moderate.18

1.5 KEEPING A SAFE NAVIGATIONAL WATCH ON FISHING VESSELS

Arosashould have had a copy of MCA’s Marine Guidance Note MGN 84 (F)

Keeping a Safe Navigational Watch on Fishing Vesselson board, as it was a

requirement of her United Kingdom Fishing Vessel Certificate - see section

1.2.3.

The following extracts from MGN 84 (F) are relevant to this accident:

2. What are the Arrangements of a Safe Navigational Watch?

The watch should always take into account the prevailing circumstances and

conditions. Even where there is no statutory requirement for certificated

officers, it is still essential that watchkeepers are always experienced,

capable, and have been instructed in their duties. This is especially vital if

you are making a landfall, navigating close to the coast, in restricted visibility,

severe weather conditions or in dense traffic.

When deciding the composition of the watch the following factors should be

considered:

the weather conditions, visibility and the time of day. …..two people

should always be on watch during the hours of darkness and in poor

weather conditions; 

the proximity of navigational hazards which make it necessary for

additional navigational duties to be undertaken;

the use and operational condition of navigational aids such as radar,

automatic pilot, and position fixing equipment.

3. Fitness for Duty

Both the skipper and the watchkeepers should take full account of the quality

and quantity of rest taken when determining fitness for duty. Particular

dangers exist when the watchkeeper is alone. It is all too easy to fall asleep,

especially while sitting down in an enclosed wheelhouse. Watchkeepers

should ensure they remain alert by moving frequently, and ensuring good

ventilation.

4. Navigation

The intended voyage should be planned in advance taking into account any

relevant information. Courses should be checked before departure.

It is important that watchkeepers maintain a close watch on their own vessel

and always know the position, speed and course steered. Many groundings

occur when the position is not being monitored and the watchkeeper thinks

he is in safe water. 19

5. Navigational Equipment

It is strongly recommended that any automatic pilot fitted should incorporate

a watch alarm. It is advised that a watch alarm fitted on board ALL vessels

where there may be one person on navigational watch. The watch alarm will

not only alert the watchkeeper but also other members of the crew.

Over-reliance on video plottershas been a factor in several recent collisions

and groundings. Using an electronic system does not remove the need for

proper passage planning and navigation, using properly scaled paper charts.

Assessments for assumptions based on video plotters alone are dangerous

and unreliable. A video plotter used for fishing purposes is not adequate for

safe navigation. 

If you use a video plotter, bear in mind the limitations of this type of

equipment and always crosscheck the accuracy of your position, course and

speed. Equipment of this type may aid navigation, but it cannot replace the

fundamental need to maintain a visual lookout.

1.6 MUSTERS AND DRILLS

The Merchant Shipping Fishing Vessels (Safety Provisions) Rules 1975 specify

the requirements for musters and drills, the relevant parts of which are quoted

below:

The skipper of every vessel of 24.4m in length and over to which these Rules

apply shall prepare or cause to prepare a muster list showing in respect of

each member of the crew the special duties which are allotted to him and the

station to which he shall go in the event of an emergency.

The muster list shall also specify the means of indicating when the vessel is

to be abandoned.

In every such vessel of 24.4m in length and over the muster list shall show

the duties assigned to the different members of the crew in connection with:- 

the preparation and launching of liferafts not attached to davits and other

life-saving appliances.

In vessels of 24.4m in length and over to which these Rules apply musters of

the crew shall take place at the commencement of each voyage and at

intervals of not more than 14 days thereafter, and if more than 25% of the

crew have been replaced at any port one of such musters shall take place

within 48 hours of leaving port to ensure the crew understand and are drilled

in the duties assigned to them in the event of an emergency.20

1.7 FISHERMEN’S SAFETY TRAINING

Under the Fishing Vessels (Safety Training) Regulations 1989, all new entrants

to the fishing industry are required to undertake safety training before going to

sea for the first time, and serving fishermen are required to undertake the

training on a phased basis by age group.

The training consists of instruction in:

(a) basic sea survival techniques

(b) basic fire-fighting and prevention; and 

(c) basic first-aid.

The basic sea survival course instructs fishermen in:

(i) how to enter water from a height; 

(ii) the effects of immersion in water and the support provided by a

properly adjusted lifejacket;

(iii) the importance of wearing suitable clothing;

(iv) how to inflate an inflatable liferaft;

(v) how to board an inflatable liferaft from the water

(vi) the procedures to be followed having boarded an inflatable liferaft;

(vii) how to right a capsized inflatable liferaft;

(viii) the management of an inflatable liferaft when afloat;

(ix) the operation and use of all inflatable liferaft equipment;

(x) the operation and use of survival craft portable radio equipment;

and 

(xi) the correct use of a helicopter lifting strop.21SECTION 2 - ANALYSIS2.1 AIM

The purpose of the analysis is to determine the contributory causes and

circumstances of the accident as a basis for making recommendations, if any,

with the aim of preventing similar accidents occurring again.

2.2 THE REASONS FOR APPARENTLY SEEKING SHELTER

The patrón de pesca was on watch when the fishing operations stopped and the

passage towards the coast began. Therefore, it would have been his decision to

apparently seek shelter in Galway Bay. The area forecast for Shannon was

severe gale force 9 to storm force 10, and it was the worst weather of all the

surrounding areas. The patrón de pesca should have received the forecasts

which probably influenced his decision to stop fishing and to seek shelter.

However, it is believed that when the weather deteriorates to this extent,

Spanish fishing vessels normally stop fishing, heave to and ride out the storm. 

Arosahad been fishing for about 4? days, which was only a quarter of the way

through her fishing trip, and there was no urgency to land her catch. Rossaveel

is a small, but developing fishing port on the northern side of Galway Bay.

Because of restricted berth space, the port requires visiting fishing vessels (and

especially the larger ones) to give 24-hours notice of their ETAs. The port

received neither Arosa’s intention to visit, nor her ETA. Arosahad never entered

this port before.

It is not known whether the two patróns had been to Rossaveel on other

vessels, or had sought shelter in Galway Bay before.

It is apparent that the patrón de pesca decided not to heave to and ride out the

weather but to seek shelter. His decision might have been influenced by the

heavy weather damage which Arosahad suffered earlier in the year. There is

evidence that he took into consideration the repair to the hull made in Ardrossan,

and was concerned that one of the doubler plates might lift.  During fish-storing

operations, the crew were working close to the repair area, and the survivor and

another deckhand saw what they considered to be a small ingress of water on

the evening of 2 October.  However, there is insufficient evidence to indicate

whether or not the ingress of water was becoming worse. Additionally, it might

have been the patrón de pesca’s own natural caution which made him decide to

head for shelter, bearing in mind that this was only his third trip in command. It

could have been a combination of any, or all three, of these influences.22

2.3 THE APPROACH TO THE IRISH COAST

The survivor of the accident had no specific knowledge of the navigation

systems on board Arosa, nor all of the reasons why the patrón de pesca wanted

to stop fishing and head for Galway Bay. However, it seems probable, from the

two patróns’ routines (see section 1.2.4), that the patrón de costa had charge

of the navigational watch during Arosa’s approach to the Irish coast.

Arosa’s GPS positions from the satellite-based vessel monitoring system data,

when she was alongside in Ardrossan and Killybegs, and the distress position

given to Valentia Radio, were very accurate. Therefore, the navigational

positioning systems can be considered to have been functioning properly.

The 1846 position of latitude 53° 04’ 50” N, longitude 012° 28’ 41” W marks the

start of the run towards the Irish coast. The direct course to enter Galway Bay,

through the North Sound, was 087°(T). However, Arosadid not take a direct

route, but initially made a track towards Skerd Rocks.

During the passage, the course and speed made good varied as follows:

In the first 2-hour period to 2046 she made good a course of 084° and a

speed of 10.0 knots. 

In the second 2-hour period to 2246 she made good a course of 082°

and she maintained the same speed as before.

In the third 2-hour period to 0046 she made good a course of 080° and a

speed to 10.1 knots.

In the fourth and last 2-hour period to 0246, she made good a course of

078° and a speed of 10.1 knots.

The track can be seen on the chart extract 3 overleafand shows that the

vessel was being blown to the north by the strong south-south-west winds (see

table in section 1.4). It appears that the drift was not being compensated for,

and that a direct course to the coast and/or Galway Bay was not being followed.

However, she was making her best speed. The patrón de pesca was on watch

when the fishing operations stopped and the passage towards the coast began

at about 1846. The patrón de costa took over the watch at about 2100 (2300

ship’s time) and between these two times the vessel had been allowed to drift to

the north of the direct track to Galway Bay.  This continued during the patrón de

costa’s watch. Therefore, during the handover of the watch at 2100, the patrón

de pesca probably gave instructions to the patrón de costa not to compensate

for the drift, and to alter course for Galway Bay later, when they were closer to

the land.23

By not steering a more southerly course, to compensate for the drift, the wind and

seas were close to the starboard beam. By taking the uncompensated course, the

vessel had the wind and seas on her starboard quarter, making the movement of

the vessel easier for the crew. 

It is concluded that the patrón de costa was probably making for an approximate

position off the land, so that he could turn, eventually, to the south and run in to

Galway Bay from the north.  He was trying to achieve two objectives: steer a

course to ease the vessel’s movements for the crew’s benefit and to steer towards

an optimum position not too far north of Galway Bay. With these objectives in

mind, he did not need to compensate for the leeway to the north. 

Although the certificates of competency on board did not equate to the minimum

requirements of the MCA, it is uncertain what, if any, effect this had on the causes

of the accident.

2.4 THE GROUNDING

2.4.1 The approach to Skerd Rocks

In the approach to the coast there are two large lighthouses: Slyne Head (28

miles range) and on Rock Island (23 miles range). From section 1.4, because the

visibility was moderate to poor, these lighthouses might not have been visible to

the patrón de costa. As he approached the coastline, which is sparsely populated,

he would have had very few shore lights to give him some orientation, even if the

visibility had allowed it. The main navigational aids available to him were the radar

and GPS sets.

The last vessel monitoring system position was sent at 0246, at which time the

vessel had made a course of 078° from the 0046-position report. The vessel was

11 miles off the mainland and just over 9 miles from Wild Bellows Rock (ahead)

and Mile Rocks (on the starboard bow). The vessel was also west-by-north by

about 11 miles from the Skerd Rocks group, from which Doonguddle rock is about

5 cables to the east-south-east of Skerdmore.

At some point after 0246, Arosamust have turned to starboard to make a new

course for the entrance to Galway Bay. If the alteration had been made at 0246,

the distance to run to Doonguddle was 11.3 miles. At 10 knots it would have taken

1 hour 8 minutes to arrive there, which would have been 0354; a little too early an

arrival time. It would seem logical that he made the alteration nearer to 0300, the

distance to Doonguddle being 11.6 miles and a run time of 1 hour 10 minutes,

which is closer to the grounding time of 0404 (see chart extract 4 overleaf).  The

course from 0300 (allowing a margin of 1 mile away from Skerd Rocks) is

approximately 120°. After the turn had been made the wind would have been

directly on the starboard beam, and the vessel’s drift rate to the north would have

increased towards Skerd Rocks.24Position of grounding

Chart Extract 3Reproduced from Admiralty Chart 1125 by permission of

the Controller of HMSO and the UK Hydrographic Office25Chart Extract 4Reproduced from Admiralty Chart 2173 by permission of

the Controller of HMSO and the UK Hydrographic Office2.4.2 Possible reasons for the grounding 

1. Navigation

The electronic chart in use (see chart extract 1 at section 1.2.4)had a scale of

1:150,000, which was sufficient to show the individual islands of the Skerd

Rocks group, and to give adequate plotting intervals in the vessel’s approach.

Ideally, the largest scale chart, such as Admiralty Chart No 1820 (1:75,000),

should be used for navigation. Chart extract 6 overleaf shows the newC-MAP

large-scale electronic chart for Doonguddle which can be compared in the

amount of detail with chart extract number 5 opposite, the computer-enlarged

version of the oldelectronic chart in use.  Paper charts were on board and one

of the British skippers had seen a small-scale chart of Northern Ireland, when on

passage between Ardrossan and Killybegs. He noted that positions were not

plotted on the paper chart. A larger scale chart (either electronic or paper) would

have highlighted Skerds Rocks.

It is possible, since leaving the fishing grounds, that track lines had not been set

up on the electronic chart (see point 4 and 5 in section 1.5). The alteration of

course position for Galway Bay might have been arbitrary, and the timing of turn

at the patrón de costa’s discretion to steer a course that would make it easy for

the crew (see section 2.3).  He might not have entered a track line after the

alteration of course towards Galway Bay, and he might have been using the

plotter to show the vessel’s position only. One of the British skippers had noted

that the vessel’s position on the electronic chart was indicated by a ***. The

Sodena software has an option in which the vessel’s course and speed over the

ground can be displayed by a vector originating from the ***. However, an

option can allow the operator to turn off the vector and use the numbers display

at the side of the plotter screen for course and speed instead.  It is possible the

patrón de costa was not using a track line and did not have the vector display in

use, both of which would have more readily alerted him that Arosawas making

leeway towards Skerd Rocks. 

By not entering track lines, or the vessel’s vector display, the vessel might have

approached inadvertently too close to Skerd Rocks. This could have been

averted by positions being plotted systematically on a paper chart. 

2627Chart Extract 5 - A computer enlarged version of the electronic navigation chart in use on Arosa

Skerdmore

Doonguddle28Chart Extract 6 - The new C-MAP electronic navigation chart2. Fatigue

It is possible that the patrón de costa was fatigued and had possibly fallen

asleep after the alteration of course, which was just over an hour before the

grounding. It is to be borne in mind that the time of grounding occurred at the

end of his 7-hour navigational watch, which was 0600 Spanish time and when

the patrón de pesca was due to relieve the patrón de costa. 

Fatigue is a common cause of groundings in fishing vessels, and in this

particular case there are indicators which suggest it was a cause of the accident

(see point 3 and 5 of section 1.5). Even in rough seas Skerdmore is large

enough to be shown on the radar screen, despite heavy clutter from sea

returns. Close observation of the radar screen would have shown the operator

the presence of rocks and consequently hazards to navigation, of which the

vessel should be kept clear.  Even if they had not been seen on the radar, on a

course of east-south-east, Arosamust have passed very close to Skerdmore

rock, on which large waves would have been breaking. This should have alerted

the person on watch that the vessel was close to danger and yet, it would seem

in the 5 cables between Skerdmore rock and Doonguddle rock, no action was

taken to avoid an imminent grounding. 

On this occasion, the patrón de costa had not called a deckhand, and was on

watch alone. Normally, a deckhand keeps a lookout with the patróns when on

passage, but apparently not on this occasion, which was against the advice of

MGN 84 (F) (see point 2 in section 1.5). It must have been the patrón de

costa’s personal decision not to call any of the deckhands to the watch, and to

allow them to rest during the passage to Galway Bay after their work in the

fishing operations.  There was neither a lookout, nor a watch alarm, to ensure

the patrón de costa did not fall asleep.

However, the sleep pattern for the patrón de costa was regular, and he had had

two rest periods during 2 October, the last one from about 1830 to 2300 (ship’s

time). There was no bridge chair in the wheelhouse, only a dining-table stool. It

has been known for fishermen and other watchkeepers to fall asleep standing

up. He would have been standing up for the 7 hours before the grounding and

would have been becoming tired by that time at the end of his watch. On the

other hand, it would have been difficult to fall asleep, since the vessel had

turned to head for Galway and she was rolling considerably in the beam seas.

3. Mechanical

Being awake at the time of the accident, the survivor would have noted a

difference in engine noise had there been a failure of the main engine. If the

engine had been taken out of gear but left running (for whatever reason), the

survivor would have noticed the resulting difference in the movement of the

vessel.  It is unlikely that the grounding was caused by failure, because the

engine was still running after the grounding.

29There might have been a steering gear malfunction, which produced a sudden

and unintended change of course as the vessel was passing Skerd Rocks

towards Doonguddle. If this had occurred there would have been a period of

time between the failure and the grounding in which the patrón de costa should

have been alerted to the alteration of course, possibly by the automatic pilot